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Summary 
 
Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis (NIPD) could significantly change the framework for testing and 
screening in pregnancy. This chapter reviews the ethical implications of this technology, including 
current issues in prenatal diagnosis, implications for informed consent, possible non-medical uses 
and options for regulation. The prospect of NIPD normalising screening and termination in 
pregnancy is raised as a concern. NIPD will also require monitoring to ensure women are making 
well-informed decisions, given that a risk to the pregnancy is absent. The question of whether NIPD 
will reduce anxiety needs to be established and the prospect that it will increase terminations on the 
grounds of disability should be recognised. The offer of NIPD external to any clinical oversight might 
give rise to wider social sex selection, paternity testing or testing ‘for information’. The value 
assumptions of these uses of NIPD need to be addressed. 
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Introduction 
 
Testing or screening for fetal abnormality has fundamentally changed women's experiences of 
pregnancy. The advent of ultrasound, amniocentesis, chorionic villus sampling (CVS) and maternal 
serum screening (MSS) have enabled health professionals to offer women several sources of 
potentially significant information about the health of their fetus. Yet although these technologies 
do allow women to make informed choices in pregnancy, each is subject to limitations. Ultrasound 
can only detect physical abnormality, amniocentesis and CVS carry a small risk of pregnancy loss and 
MSS provides only a probability of harm, which can be difficult to interpret. 
 
In the past decade, the isolation and analysis of free fetal DNA (ffDNA) or whole fetal cells in 
maternal blood has emerged as another method for testing during pregnancy. These technologies, 
explained in more detail elsewhere in this special issue, aim to offer non-invasive prenatal diagnosis 
(NIPD) to provide definitive molecular or chromosomal information about the health of a fetus 
without posing a risk to the pregnancy.1 NIPD is now beginning to change the landscape of prenatal 
testing: tests on ffDNA are already proven for fetal gender, rhesus D blood type and some Mendelian 
conditions such as achondroplasia. More tests are under development, including aneuploidy 
detection and Down syndrome.2 For the purposes of this chapter, NIPD is assumed to be clinically 
valid, with a predictive value commensurate to invasive methods. 
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The impact of NIPD on fetal medicine and pregnant women is predicted to be significant and ethical 
issues will arise.3 In contemplating the implementation of this technology, we can ask whether 
aspects of NIPD give rise to new ethical questions, or whether we are instead required to revisit 
existing dilemmas in prenatal diagnosis. NIPD is not the only non-invasive procedure available to 
women during pregnancy; ultrasound and MSS are also non-invasive. But unlike these existing 
methods, NIPD can offer definitive information about the health of a fetus at an early stage of 
pregnancy without putting the pregnancy at risk. Arguably, this gives rise to new nuances in ethical 
debates over prenatal diagnosis, perhaps most importantly the implications for informed consent. 
Yet existing issues in prenatal diagnosis will continue to be relevant, and for this reason these 
debates are briefly rehearsed in the following section. 
 
Ethical issues in prenatal diagnosis 
 
As a source of information about the health of a fetus during pregnancy, NIPD raises ethical issues 
familiar to anyone with experience of prenatal diagnosis (PND). Several existing issues in PND remain 
unresolved and, as the molecular bases of more and more conditions affecting health are identified, 
the dilemma of what constitutes a permissible test remains acute. The development and 
implementation of NIPD will raise new ethical concerns but these should also be assessed against 
existing debates over PND.4 
 
With any offer of PND to a pregnant woman, there is an implicit value assumption that some 
inherited or congenital conditions give rise to a lower quality of life for those who have them. At the 
level of screening, there is an accepted yet unarticulated expectation that the availability of a 
screening programme will reduce the incidence of the condition of interest in the population, 
although programmes do emphasise that women should be assisted to make an informed choice. 
These factors are naturally sensitive and have given rise to myriad debates in the clinical and ethical 
literature. These debates tend to focus on two interrelated problems: whether PND is eugenic and 
whether it discriminates against people living with the condition (the ‘disability rights critique’). 
 
Although an in-depth analysis of these debates is beyond the scope of this chapter, they should not 
go unnoticed. One concern with PND is whether it exemplifies eugenics—the improvement of the 
gene pool for the next generation through eradicating genetic disease. Although modern practice in 
fetal medicine and clinical genetics is nothing like the state-imposed ideals of population perfection 
that occurred in the early twentieth century, considerations of social justice cannot be ignored.5 
Likewise, women require access to high-quality and unbiased information on the condition they are 
being tested for and they must be free to make informed choices about PND, including refusing 
testing. 
 
A related concern with PND is that it devalues the lives of, or otherwise discriminates against, people 
living with the condition being tested for. Activists in this debate query the impact of a test on our 
attitudes to the condition (for example, Down syndrome) and claim that the availability of tests 
systematically stigmatises these groups, even if no overtly discriminatory statements are made. One 
response to the disability critique is that women choosing to terminate an affected pregnancy are 
not discriminating against or stigmatising existing people with the same condition, but that having 
been given a choice they are deciding they would rather have a child without the condition. They are 
also choosing to select against a condition and not against a person.6 But as Asch recognises, 
choosing against a trait is difficult without also choosing against a fetus.7 
 
NIPD does give rise to a small but insidious risk that screening in pregnancy and termination of 
affected fetuses could become normalised. Press coverage of NIPD to date has, however, 
concentrated on the prevention of miscarriage.8 There is little mention that, if offered widely, NIPD 
could increase the detection of abnormalities in pregnancy, potentially leading to increased 
terminations. Women should have access to sound and unbiased information and appropriate time 
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to reflect before making a decision about NIPD. We should also ensure it does not lead to a 
perpetuation of negative conceptions of illness and disease. 
 
Other ethical considerations arising in PND will, by implication, need to be assessed in the context of 
NIPD: 
 
 In comparison with previous generations, women now experience a so-called medicalised or 
‘tentative pregnancy’, in which they might be unable to bond with their fetus until it is 
known that ‘all is well’. In some cases this can be quite late in the pregnancy.9, 10 and 11 
 Is there a right ‘not to know’ or a right to remain in ignorance about the health of a fetus 
during pregnancy?12 
 Should only ‘serious’ conditions be subject to PND? Or, should it be up to women and 
couples to autonomously decide what is ‘serious’ for them (and which might be ‘minor’ to 
others), based on their ‘lived experience’ of the condition?13*, 14, 15* and 16 
 As a matter of professional ethics, deciding what to do when a woman or couple makes a 
seemingly unjustifiable request for PND.17 and 18 
 Whether and how unexpected information should be passed on to women, particularly in a 
context of ‘targeted testing’, where women are informed about only a few conditions before 
PND takes place.19 
 
Advantages of NIPD 
 
Despite the ethical issues arising in the provision of PND, NIPD might offer some practical (and 
therefore ethical) advantages. Primarily, NIPD could reduce the number of miscarriages caused by 
PND, as amniocentesis and CVS carry a small risk of pregnancy loss. A ‘normal’ result from NIPD—a 
test that poses no risk to the pregnancy—could mean that fewer women undergo further invasive 
testing. However, not all women might be reassured by a normal NIPD result. One North American 
study examining attitudes to NIPD of fetal cells suggests that nearly half of the women receiving a 
‘normal’ result would still opt for invasive diagnosis, just to be sure.20 In a resource-constrained 
environment like the National Health Service this is a point to consider—is there value in offering 
NIPD when it might not prevent women from seeking PND? However, with careful pretest 
information, this consequence is not a certainty. 
 
Another benefit of NIPD is that as the test can be performed and results reported earlier in 
pregnancy than for CVS or amniocentesis, anxiety might be reduced. Women will be able to make 
decisions earlier and will therefore have better opportunities for prenatal bonding. They are also 
sure to appreciate the reduced pain and discomfort offered by NIPD. However women must also be 
informed that the earlier NIPD is performed in pregnancy, the less accurate it might be. Another 
potential concern is that those women receiving ‘abnormal’ results will then have to decide whether 
to proceed to invasive diagnosis before making a decision about termination, which might 
necessitate waiting until the appropriate week of gestation. This intervening period could raise 
anxiety levels, counteracting any benefit of NIPD. 
 
Informed consent and informed choice to NIPD 
 
A decision about testing or screening in pregnancy carries significant weight and can have far-
reaching implications for women. To this end, any decision about NIPD should be made in 
accordance with a suitable model of informed choice or informed consent. 
 
The operation of informed consent and informed choice are subtly different. Informed consent 
tends to be applied in situations where a woman is facing a designated diagnostic test. Three 
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elements need to be satisfied: the provision of appropriate information, the recipient's capacity to 
make a decision and an absence of undue force (including adequate time to decide). Informed 
choice, on the other hand, tends to be used in screening programmes where a test might be for 
susceptibility rather than diagnosis. Informed choice requires that a decision be based on relevant 
knowledge, consistency with the values of the decision-maker and behavioural implementation.21 
The process of making a decision might be less active than with informed consent and might not 
require sustained discussions with a health professional.22 
 
Before women are offered NIPD on a wider scale, we should ask what model(s) of pretest decision 
making are appropriate. Should women be offered testing and be provided with information some 
time before having the test? Or, should it instead form a routine part of antenatal care, requiring 
less information, formality of consent and time for reflection? This will likely depend on whether 
NIPD is being used to ascertain a woman's risk in light of a positive family history, or whether it 
forms part of a risk assessment offered to all pregnant women. Whilst in its early implementation a 
woman is unlikely to base a termination decision on NIPD alone, results could establish women on a 
path towards a decision about termination; something they may not have contemplated when 
electing to have NIPD. Additionally, women can experience a burden from choice and this should be 
taken into account.23 
 
NIPD circumvents the initial risk-based result obtained with MSS and removes the risk to pregnancy 
as a reason for declining testing. These parameters can act as powerful regulators of the uptake of 
definitive testing in pregnancy; having time to reflect and refine one's attitudes towards disability or 
impairment can be valuable before receiving definitive information. We need to plan for how their 
possible removal might affect women's experience of prenatal testing and screening; if a barrier to 
testing is removed, will women feel less justified in declining or be more open to persuasion? The 
similarity of these tests with other blood draws during pregnancy might mask the implications. 
Professionals providing NIPD should ensure that, before definitive testing, all the facts are presented 
with adequate time for reflection, including the voluntary nature of testing and where to obtain 
further support if required. 
 
Current debates on prenatal diagnosis and screening should also be taken into account. Researchers 
have questioned whether women are providing informed consent or making informed choices, or 
whether they are having testing in reaction to external pressures. Information provided to women 
varies across Europe24 and the routinisation of antenatal screening has also led some to ask 
whether women are making considered decisions.25 A recent French study, for example, concluded 
that the majority of women do not currently provide fully informed consent for maternal serum 
screening.26 However, two Dutch studies examining prenatal screening offer a more optimistic 
assessment of whether informed choice is being achieved.27 and 28 Yet one of these also found that 
those who accepted testing made less informed decisions than those who declined27 and the other 
contended that insufficient knowledge remains a problem.28 
 
A North American study has also examined informed consent to NIPD and found a similar pattern.20 
Researchers asked whether women would feel pressured to have a non-invasive diagnostic maternal 
blood test, and found that a substantial minority (28.5%) would perceive no choice but to have the 
test. Another minor but substantial proportion would have the test on a doctor's recommendation 
(28.8%). As a new technology, NIPD will be accompanied by sound pre-test counselling, including 
descriptions of any limitations to the technology. But as it becomes more integrated into clinical 
practice, the choices being offered to women and the models of informed consent or informed 
choice being used should be re-evaluated. Psychosocial studies should be carried out during the 
early stages of NIPD to help inform an appropriate model for pre-test information and counselling. 
 
 
 
5 |  P a g e
 
NIPD and fetal sexing 
 
The first application of NIPD was to determine fetal sex, as the detection of Y-chromosome DNA in a 
pregnant woman offers a robust prediction of a male fetus. This might be more predictive than 
ultrasound and easier to provide than other invasive molecular methods of determining sex that 
necessitate access to clinical services. Indeed, commercial providers of NIPD for fetal sex are already 
operating.29, 30 and 31* The ethical implications of prenatal sex determination are well-addressed 
in the literature but, given their importance to NIPD, they are addressed briefly here. 
 
Medically indicated fetal sexing 
 
Not all prenatal sex determination is ethically contentious. When a diagnostic test for an X-linked 
condition is not available, fetal sexing can be used even though it might mean that a healthy male 
pregnancy is terminated. More frequently, it is used as a first-line investigation before a more 
involved (and therefore expensive) molecular test. NIPD might serve as a substitute for PND in both 
of these situations. It will also help avoid invasive testing for some X-linked conditions as no invasive 
PND will be required if NIPD indicates a female fetus.32 
 
NIPD does give rise to two new ethical concerns over medically indicated fetal sexing. A recent audit 
of NIPD indicates that 23% of 160 women obtaining NIPD have done so for haemophilia (L Chitty, 
personal communication). This condition is usually treatable and is not a common indication for 
requesting invasive diagnostic prenatal diagnosis, at least in the UK. Knowing whether a fetus is at 
risk will change arrangements for delivery, but sex can be determined at the 20-week scan for no 
extra cost. It therefore appears that some women might be accessing NIPD to establish fetal sex 
earlier in the pregnancy. Although there is no suggestion that women are seeking terminations 
based on fetal sex in these circumstances (which would constitute sex selection via the ‘back door’), 
providing a test that could be achieved via other means has resource implications. 
 
Women could also use NIPD to sidestep the need for preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) for X-
linked conditions. Given the expense and low success rate associated with PGD, women could 
become pregnant naturally, use NIPD to establish fetal sex and then procure a termination for male 
fetuses early in pregnancy using the safe medical methods now available. This could lead to the 
establishment of a pregnancy that is not at risk more quickly than undergoing PGD. This raises 
implications for policy makers. In response to these developments, the criteria for reporting fetal sex 
should be carefully monitored. 
 
Fetal sexing for non-medical reasons 
 
Whereas finding out a baby's gender might be a benign diversion for a couple impatient to bond 
with their baby, it also raises concerns over the potential for terminating a pregnancy deemed to be 
of the ‘wrong’ sex for personal, cultural or economic reasons. The clinical consensus regarding sex 
selection in established pregnancies is that this should not be permitted. Support exists for 
restricting information about sex given to women within legal abortion limits, unless the information 
is medically relevant.33 The predominant arguments against non-medical sex selection are that it: 
 
 will cause harm to the child born as a result of stereotyped expectations 
 demonstrates sex discrimination 
 is not part of a parent's prerogative34 
 makes professionals morally complicit in an unethical activity 
 could upset sex ratios 
 will lead us down a ‘slippery slope’ to ‘designer children’35 
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Those adopting a permissive stance towards sex selection instead highlight the importance of 
procreative liberty or autonomy, in which parents should be able to make considered choices 
consistent with their values.35 Also raised are claims about the dearth of empirical literature proving 
harm, the unlikely skewing of sex ratios in most cultures and the acceptability of ‘family 
balancing’.36 
 
The non-invasive nature of NIPD could add to these debates. It has become possible to detect fetal 
sex without leaving one's home; using mail-order test kits to exploit finger-prick blood samples. In 
one instance, wide use of such a kit has led to a class action following inaccurate results.37 At 
present, NIPD explicitly for the purpose of gender selection is unlikely to be offered by any 
professional in fetal medicine, and women are not indicating they would desire it.20 And any 
termination of pregnancy that might result following from this test will have to be lawful within the 
relevant jurisdiction. However, technically there is no barrier to a couple determining sex and then 
seeking a ‘social termination’ from a separate provider. 
 
The issue of non-medical sex selection is of concern to those working in NIPD, and some have called 
for international guidelines to regulate its application.38 Moreover, if a woman is suffering 
oppression or pressure from her family or wider culture to have a child of a chosen sex, the prospect 
of her being subjected to this test against her will is a possibility. In response to this, the burden of 
proof for consent to testing should be made the responsibility of the test provider and educational 
materials should take this into account. Should NIPD for gender testing become widespread, women 
seeking social terminations could also be asked to sign a declaration about NIPD for gender. 
 
Other non-medical uses of NIPD 
 
Fetal sex might not be the only non-medical application for which NIPD is sought. Women or couples 
might also be interested in using the technology ‘for information only’, or to undertake a prenatal 
paternity test. 
 
Use of NIPD for ‘information’ 
 
The fact that NIPD removes the risk of pregnancy loss could have another interesting outcome. 
Presently, couples tend not to proceed with an invasive test in pregnancy if they have no intention 
to terminate in light of a gene-positive result. However, if NIPD were to become widely available 
then couples could obtain information on a range of conditions (medically significant or otherwise), 
which they might be interested to know about but would not want to risk the pregnancy to find out. 
Indeed, NIPD has already been used for achondroplasia.39 
 
In questioning the acceptability of such testing, several factors should be considered, including: Does 
the test represent a good use of scarce resources? Will the management of the pregnancy change as 
a result of the test? What expectations might the couple have for the pregnancy and the child who 
will be born? Would a similar test be offered if the child was already born?40 and 41 One group of 
clinicians has already suggested that the precedent of whether PND is available for a chosen 
condition should be used to indicate the acceptability of NIPD.3 
 
Prenatal paternity testing 
 
A potentially more worrying application of NIPD is in prenatal paternity testing. Although this is not 
yet in the literature, experts in NIPD have already raised the issue.3 Prenatal paternity testing is 
currently rare, as placing a pregnancy at risk merely to determine who the genetic father will be is 
problematic. However, once the risk of pregnancy loss is removed, would NIPD to determine 
paternity be acceptable? 
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On the one hand, we can imagine a pregnant woman who is conscious that her child's genetic 
parentage might be uncertain. If she is able to determine this definitively early in pregnancy she can 
inform the biological progenitor (and potentially the other interested party). This will remove any 
prospect of a man harbouring incorrect assumptions about pending biological parenthood. 
 
However, we can also imagine a pregnant women intent on testing to determine whether she will 
continue the pregnancy. This is more difficult to justify (perhaps with some exceptions, such as 
pregnancy as a result of rape) as it would seem that the woman is prepared only to carry a 
pregnancy to term based on a particular biological father. 
 
Detailed consideration of these issues is beyond the scope of this chapter but should be borne in 
mind by policy makers, as should the possibility that inadvertent paternity testing could occur when 
performing some non-invasive tests, such as early fetal rhesus typing. Additionally, as with any 
paternity test, a woman commissioning NIPD for paternity should be counselled about the legal and 
financial implications of testing, the potential for psychological harm and the significance of 
biological over social kinship. 
 
Regulatory issues in the provision of NIPD 
 
The simplicity of obtaining samples for NIPD gives rise to the prospect that this technology will be 
made available on a commercial basis, perhaps circumventing clinical professionals altogether. This 
property of NIPD means that policy and regulatory issues regarding the availability of this testing 
need to be addressed soon. Annas recognised this potential problem over a decade ago.42 He 
proposed three alternative models for control of NIPD: the medical, market and regulatory models. 
 
Under the medical model, health professionals would act as gatekeepers to NIPD. This would respect 
the current status quo, whereby there is professional discretion to determine whether a test is 
indicated. Professional colleges and associations can also develop policy to provide overarching 
guidance. 
 
The market model reflects some of the developments in modern genetics, particularly in North 
America. That is, commercial entities are permitted to offer NIPD in response to consumer demand, 
based on personal values. Services can be provided in person, by mail-order or online. Those 
providing NIPD on a commercial basis should be largely left alone to get on with business, albeit one 
in which they are not permitted to miss-sell their product or otherwise mislead consumers. Women 
might be convinced they ‘need’ NIPD through targeted advertising. This model is already visible in 
over-the-counter genetic testing and will be difficult to control in a global marketplace.43 
 
A strict regulatory model is, if broadly applied, likely to lead to claims of government intrusion in 
private decision-making. In countries like the UK, great value is placed on individual freedom and 
society is generally suspicious of attempts of overarching regulation. That said, the Human 
Fertilization and Embryology Authority has successfully regulated assisted reproduction for over 15 
years and, despite some criticism, is generally considered a responsible body for overseeing this 
complex area. Although regulations demanding mandatory screening are unlikely, a ‘lighter-touch’ 
regime from governments making general recommendations about NIPD is likely to be welcomed by 
most. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis is a promising technology. It will simplify many aspects of testing 
and screening in pregnancy, but will also introduce some new complexities. NIPD also forces us to 
revisit existing debates in prenatal diagnosis, to determine how they might change and what 
safeguards might be required. 
8 |  P a g e
 
 
At the very least, some of the questions that should be applied to NIPD are: Why is this test being 
considered at this stage in pregnancy? What benefits and concerns might it give rise to and what 
does existing practice tell us? These will serve as useful guides to the acceptability of NIPD, whether 
for prenatal diagnosis, antenatal screening, sex identification, paternity testing or ‘information’. The 
psychosocial issues raised by this technology should also be investigated before it is widely 
introduced.20 
 
Practice points 
 
 Non-invasive prenatal diagnosis will allow women to obtain information about the health of 
their fetus without the risk of pregnancy loss. 
 It is important to bear in mind existing issues in prenatal diagnosis and to recognise that 
NIPD will not circumvent these. 
 Careful attention should be paid to mechanisms of informed consent and informed choice 
for NIPD. 
 Policy makers and clinicians should be ready to respond to possible non-medical uses of 
NIPD, such as social sex selection and paternity testing. 
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